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INTRODUCTION 
Current efforts to foster research on orphan diseases are focused 
largely on pharmaceutical treatments. Currently, there are roughly 770 
FDA approved pharmaceutical treatments designated for orphan diseases.1 
The number of treatments has greatly improved and it can largely be 
attributed to government efforts to foster research on orphan diseases. 
However, more can be done to bridge the gap between the number of 
available treatments, both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical, and the 
number of different orphan diseases. These efforts should be supplemented 
by initiatives to bolster diffusion and commercialization of innovations 
made by the user-innovator community. 
 
 1 The number of FDA approved treatments for orphan diseases was collected from the U.S. Food & 
Drug Administration orphan drug designation search. To determine the number of approved treatments, 
I ran the search for only approved products. The search was run as of March 11, 2019. Search Orphan 
Drug Designations and Approvals, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/opdlisting/oopd/
index.cfm [https://perma.cc/X64K-2J3E] (enter “03/11/2019” in “End Date” field and “Only approved 
products” in “Search results” field) [hereinafter Designations and Approvals]. 
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Part I of this note introduces orphan diseases. Part II of this note 
examines current efforts to foster research on orphan diseases, including 
the Orphan Drug Act and the U.S. patent system. Through analysis of the 
incentive provided by these efforts, I conclude that current efforts focus 
largely on pharmaceutical treatments. Part III of this note introduces user 
innovation theory and current examples of user innovation by orphan 
disease patients. In this part, I will show that patient innovation frequently 
occurs within the orphan disease space. I will also show that, although 
patients innovate, they do not share or diffuse their innovation enough to 
maximize the impact of user innovation on orphan diseases. Part VI of this 
note addresses the successes and challenges of current efforts to foster 
orphan disease research. Part V of this note makes suggestions for 
government intervention to incentivize diffusion of patient innovation. 
I. ORPHAN DISEASES 
An orphan disease, also known as a rare disease, is “any disease or 
condition which . . . affects less than 200,0000 persons in the United 
States.”2 There may be upwards of 7,000 different orphan diseases.3 Some 
orphan diseases are familiar, like cystic fibrosis and Lou Gehrig’s disease, 
while others are less familiar.4 Most orphan diseases are inherited through 
gene mutations.5 However, environmental factors, such as diet or exposure 
to chemicals, can also play a role in an orphan disease.6 Although each 
individual orphan disease affects a small amount of the population, in sum, 
orphan diseases affect millions of people.7 It is estimated that twenty-five 
to thirty million Americans are affected by an orphan disease.8 However, 
not all types of orphan diseases are tracked upon diagnosis.9 Thus, the 
number of cases of orphan diseases in the United States may be lower or 
higher than the estimation. 
The discrepancy between the number of identified orphan diseases 
and the number of FDA orphan disease designated treatments suggests a 
 
 2 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(2) (2017). 
 3 FAQs About Rare Diseases, NIH, https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/pages/31/faqs-about-
rare-diseases [https://perma.cc/WKX3-H5ZQ]. 
 4 Orphan Products: Hope for People with Rare Diseases, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143563.htm [https://perma.cc/5RK7-WGAJ] [hereinafter Orphan 
Products]. 
 5 Id. 
 6 FAQs About Rare Diseases, supra note 3. 
 7 Orphan Products, supra note 4. 
 8 FAQs About Rare Diseases, supra note 3. 
 9 Id. 
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large need for increased research and development of treatment options in 
this area.10 
II. CURRENT EFFORTS TO FOSTER RESEARCH ON ORPHAN 
DISEASES 
Current efforts to foster research on orphan diseases are largely 
focused on pharmaceutical treatment. Two formal incentive structures exist 
to foster research on orphan diseases: the Orphan Drug Act and the patent 
system. The Orphan Drug Act incentivizes orphan disease drug 
development by reducing development costs and lengthening exclusivity 
on the market.11 The U.S. patent system provides a monopoly to inventors 
to recoup costs on research and development. 
A. ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
In 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed the Orphan Drug Act into 
law.12 Congress made several findings for the Orphan Drug Act: 
 
(1) there are many diseases and conditions . . . which affect such small 
numbers of individuals . . . that the diseases and conditions are considered 
rare in the United States; 
(2) adequate drugs for many of such diseases and conditions have not 
been developed; 
(3) drugs for these diseases and conditions are commonly referred to as 
“orphan drugs”; 
(4) because so few individuals are affected by any one rare disease or 
condition, a pharmaceutical company which develops an orphan drug may 
reasonably expect the drug to generate relatively small sales in 
comparison to the cost of developing the drug and consequently to incur a 
financial loss; 
(5) there is reason to believe that some promising orphan drugs will not be 
developed unless changes are made in the applicable Federal laws to 
reduce the costs of developing such drugs and to provide financial 
incentives to develop such drugs; and 
(6) it is in the public interest to provide such changes and incentives for 
the development of orphan drugs.13 
 
 10 There are only 668 FDA designated and approved orphan drug treatments. Compare 
Designations and Approvals, supra note 1, with FAQs About Rare Diseases, supra note 3. 
 11 See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983). 
 12 Sinead M. Murphy et al., Unintended Effects of Orphan Product Designation for Rare 
Neurological Diseases, 72 ANN. NEUROL. 481, 481 (2012). 
 13 Orphan Drug Act, supra note 11 at § 1 (emphasis added). 
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The intended purpose of the Orphan Drug Act, therefore, was to 
incentivize orphan drug development by reducing costs and providing 
incentives.14 To accomplish this goal, the Orphan Drug Act provides for 
market exclusivity, tax credits, access to research grants, and fee waivers.15 
To gain access to the incentives provided by the Orphan Drug Act, a 
drug must be designated as a drug for a rare disease or condition.16 To be 
designated as a drug for a rare disease or condition, a drug sponsor must 
submit an application detailing its application to a rare disease or 
condition.17 
The Orphan Drug Act grants seven years of market exclusivity to an 
approved application for a drug designated for a rare disease or condition.18 
On average, this period of seven-year exclusivity is two years longer than 
the typical period of exclusivity for a drug.19 The period of exclusivity is 
subject to two exceptions.20 If the holder of the exclusive approval “cannot 
ensure the availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the needs 
of persons with the disease or condition for which the drug was 
designated,” another application for a drug that is the same may be 
granted.21 Additionally, another application for a drug that is the same may 
be granted if the holder of the exclusive approval consents to the 
approval.22 
The Orphan Drug Act provides a twenty-five percent tax credit on 
research and development costs for orphan disease drugs.23 The tax credit 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 See 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2017); 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2017). 
 16 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (2017). 
 17 Id. For example, the drug Kymriah was designated in 2015 as an orphan drug for the treatment of 
Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, a rare disease, following Novartis’s application for designation. 
Designations and Approvals, supra note 1. 
 18 21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2017). The term of a patent is twenty years from the date of filing the patent 
application. Patents and Exclusivity, FDA, (May 19, 2015) https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/
developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9x4-M6S9]. 
Exclusivity, on the other hand, is granted by the FDA upon approval of the drug. Id. Exclusivity can run 
concurrent with the patent term and may, in some cases, extend past the patent period. Id. For example, 
if a patent is filed upon drug discovery, only part of the twenty-year period will remain after research 
and development. Exclusivity can lengthen this period if less than seven years remain on the patent 
term. Id. 
 19 Ed Rensi, The Orphan Drug Act Has Been a Huge Success, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 23, 2008, 12:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121417838559995535 [https://perma.cc/6C6V-2D43]. 
 20 21 U.S.C. § 360cc. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 26 U.S.C. § 45C (2017). 
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only applies to costs incurred before the drug approval.24 In addition, the 
costs incurred are only taken into account “only to the extent such testing is 
related to the use of a drug for the rare disease or condition for which it was 
designated.”25 
The Orphan Drug Act also grants the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services the power to make grants and enter into contracts “to assist in 
defraying the costs of developing drugs for rare diseases or conditions, 
including qualified testing expenses.”26 Qualified testing includes 
“observational studies . . . conducted to assist in the understanding of the 
natural history of a rare disease or condition.”27 Qualified testing also 
includes observational studies to “develop or validate a drug development 
tool” and to “understand the full spectrum of the disease manifestations.”28 
For each year between 2013 and 2017, $30 million was appropriated for 
grants.29 The statute has been reinstated for the same amount of funding for 
each year between 2018 and 2022.30 
Finally, the Orphan Drug Act provides for priority review for 
treatments directed to rare pediatric diseases.31 Since the passage of the 
Orphan Drug Act, the FDA has approved more than 600 orphan drug 
designations.32 Compared to only ten FDA-approved treatments for orphan 
diseases prior to the passage of the Orphan Drug Act, the Act can be 
marked as a success.33 
The Orphan Drug Act creates new incentives for the FDA drug 
approval process. Pharmaceutical companies seeking to sell a new 
prescription drug on the market must go through FDA approval.34 The FDA 
approval process requires intensive testing. First, laboratory and animal 
tests must be completed.35 Next, the drug must be tested on humans 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 21 U.S.C. § 360ee. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-52, § 603, 131 Stat. 1005, 1048 (2017). 
 31 21 U.S.C. § 360ff (Supp. V 2012). 
 32 FDA’s Orphan Drug Modernization Plan, FDA, 2 (June 29, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ForIndustry/DevelopingProductsforRareDiseasesConditions/HowtoapplyforOrphanProduct
Designation/UCM565068.pdf [https://perma.cc/B69Q-2MSL] [hereinafter Modernization Plan]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Development & Approval Process (Drugs), FDA (June 13, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm [https://perma.cc/HM7H-4EYS] [hereinafter FDA Approval 
Process]. 
 35 Id. 
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“determine whether the drug is safe when used to treat a disease.“36 
Subsequently, the company must send an application to the FDA with the 
test results, manufacturing information, and a proposed label.37 This process 
is long and expensive. New drug approval in the United States requires, on 
average, twelve years and one billion dollars.38 
While the FDA approval process is fruitful for drugs with a high 
probability of commercial success and market reach, sales of approved 
drugs and medical devices aimed at small markets may not produce enough 
revenue to justify the time and monetary investment required for FDA 
approval. In the case of orphan diseases, the failure of the commercial 
market is largely attributable to small market size.39 Because each disease 
affects such a small population, there is no way to expand the market for 
each disease.40 Small market size “makes it commercially unattractive for 
pharmaceutical firms and other medical suppliers to invest in developing 
new products specifically for rare diseases.”41 Thus, pharmaceutical firms 
and medical suppliers generally do not invest in orphan diseases, leaving 
them underserved by the traditional model of FDA approval and 
commercialization. The Orphan Drug Act remedies some of these problems 
with monetary incentives and market exclusivity. 
Although the Orphan Drug Act positively affects the amount of drugs 
targeted towards orphan disease treatment, the wide array of orphan 
diseases necessarily means that not all orphan disease research will receive 
adequate funding. Priority review for pediatric-focused treatments, while 
incentivizing for some, excludes orphan diseases that do not primarily 
affect individuals under the age of eighteen.42 What is left is the seven-year 
exclusivity provision and the tax credit that will apply to all approved drugs 
targeted at an orphan disease. 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id.; Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1, 1 JACC: BASIC TO 
TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 178 (2016) [https://perma.cc/7DKW-H4U4]. 
 38 Van Norman, supra 37 at 178. 
 39 Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market Size in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1049, 1049–90 (2004) [https://perma.cc/7LE6-AZSH]. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Pedro Oliveira et al., Innovation by Patients with Rare Diseases and Chronic Needs, 10 
ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES 1, 4 (2015). 
 42 21 U.S.C. § 360ff (Supp. V 2012). 
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B. PATENT SYSTEM 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issues 
property rights, in the form of a patent, to inventors.43 A patent grants the 
inventor “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention.”44 The patent owner can exercise these rights for 
twenty years following the date of the patent application.45 Infringement 
occurs when another “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention.”46 If a patent is infringed, the owner is entitled to 
relief.47 This relief can come in the form of an injunction or damages.48 
Patent rights are available to any inventor who submits an application to 
the USPTO and whose invention meets the requirements for patent-
eligibility.49 New and novel pharmaceutical treatments for orphan diseases 
likely meet the requirements for patent-eligibility.50 Thus, the U.S. patent 
system may also be skewed toward incentivizing pharmaceutical 
treatments. 
III. USER INNOVATION BY PATIENTS 
User innovation theory centers around the theory that users can and 
will develop the technology they need.51 There are many examples of user 
innovation by patients with orphan diseases, including an ostomy patient 
who developed technology that warns “patients when their ostomy bags are 
full so they can empty them without risking overflow.”52 In this example, 
we can see that the innovation was driven by what the end-user, in this case 
the patient, needed based on his own experience with the disease.53 
 
 43 General information concerning patents, USPTO (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/ED6Z-7YT6] [hereinafter 
General Patent Information]. 
 44 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2017). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. § 271. 
 47 General Patent Information, supra note 43. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Angélique McCall & Gene Quinn, The FDA Process, Patents and Market Exclusivity, 
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 12, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/12/fda-process-patents-market-
exclusivity/id=79305/ [https://perma.cc/A6CS-DWA9]. 
 51 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1 (2005). 
 52 Helena Canhão et al., Revolutionising Healthcare by Empowering Patients to Innovate, 1 EMJ 
INNOV. 31, 32 (2017). 
 53 Id. 
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C. INTRODUCTION TO USER INNOVATION THEORY 
The main justification for patent law is utilitarian in nature.54 The 
“purpose of the patent system is to induce the creation and 
commercialization of technology that otherwise would be easily 
appropriated.”55 Thus, “only those inventions that would otherwise not 
materialize, or would be discovered only after a longer passage of time, 
should receive the benefits of patent protection.”56 
Technological innovations are public goods.57 Public goods can be 
replicated and they are nonrivalrous, meaning that “enjoyment of them by 
one person does not prevent enjoyment of them by other persons.”58 
Because they are nonrivalrous, “other people will be able to take advantage 
of [the innovations] for free.”59 These nonpaying consumers are often 
called “free riders.”60 Without intervention, innovators will not disclose 
their innovations because “innovators will be unable to recoup the costs of 
their innovations.”61 The fear is that free-riding behavior, without 
intervention, would lead to “significant underinvestment in . . . intellectual 
resources because of the risk that competitors would appropriate their 
value.”62 
One solution to the free-rider problem is to confer intellectual property 
rights upon innovators.63 As discussed above, the USPTO grants an 
inventor “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, 
or selling the invention.”64 These property rights “lower the costs of 
exclusion, enable transactions, and mitigate the risks to investment posed 
by free riders.”65 Although intellectual property rights may resolve the free-
rider problem, there are other factors that may mitigate the need for 
intellectual property rights to stimulate innovation. 
 
 54 Alan Devlon & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of 
Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 901 (2009). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, Empirical, and Historical 
Perspectives, 37 BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 47, 47 (2001), https://cyber.harvard.edu/
people/tfisher/Innovation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU7F-6RGD]. 
 58 Id. at 47. 
 59 Id. 
 60 BRETT M. FRISCHMANN ET AL., Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE 
COMMONS 1, 6 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014). 
 61 Fisher, supra note 57, at 47. 
 62 FRISCHMANN ET AL., supra note 60, at 6 (internal citation omitted). 
 63 Fisher, supra note 57, at 49. 
 64 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2017). 
 65 FRISCHMANN ET AL., supra note 60, at 7. 
16:285 (2019) Dancing with Our Hands Tied 
293 
Even in the presence of free riders, intrinsic user motivations for 
innovation may be sufficient to stimulate innovation without conferring 
property rights to innovators.66 Under the user innovation theory, “user 
innovation is innovation motivated by an intention to use . . . an innovative 
technology.”67 User innovators are still in part motivated by utilitarian 
values, as they “expect to be rewarded by the use value of what they are 
creating . . . and . . . intrinsically by such things as the fun and learning 
experience derived from creating it.”68 Ideas for inventions come from 
users who develop improvements to serve their own needs.69 User 
innovation thrives when users have “unique local information about their 
needs and the technical capacity to make inventions that fulfill those 
needs.”70 
User innovation theory depends on users of existing technology. 
These users are motivated by developing technology for their personal 
use.71 User innovators “are unique in that they alone benefit directly from 
innovations.”72 Because user innovations benefit the user, “user innovations 
will . . . tend to be those that leverage the user’s information advantages . . . 
rather than those that leverage manufacturers’ information advantages.”73 
User innovators will invest in developing innovations because they 
“can develop exactly what they want, rather than relying on manufacturers 
to act as their own (often very imperfect) agents.”74 Additionally, user 
innovators “derive benefits from developing and using their inventions, 
which motivate[s] them to invest the effort necessary for invention.”75 
Even though user innovators must invest personal funds and time in 
developing an innovation, many user innovators “‘freely reveal’ their 
innovations to others because of private benefits they are able to obtain as a 
result.”76 When a user freely reveals their invention, “all intellectual 
property rights to that information are voluntarily given up by the 
 
 66 Id. at 10. 
 67 Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 467, 478 (2008). 
 68 Ruth Maria Stock et al., Impacts of Hedonic and Utilitarian User Motives on the Innovativeness 
of User-Developed Solutions, 32 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 389, 389 (May 2015). 
 69 VON HIPPEL, supra note 51, at 1. 
 70 Katherine J. Strandburg, Accommodating User Innovation in the International Intellectual 
Property Regime: A Global Administrative Law Approach, 2009 ACTA JURIDICA 283, 293–94 (2009). 
 71 Strandburg, supra note 67, at 469. 
 72 VON HIPPEL, supra note 51, at 3. 
 73 Id. at 45–61. 
 74 Id. at 1. 
 75 Strandburg, supra note 67, at 469. 
 76 Id. at 469–70. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
294 
innovator, and all interested parties are given access to it.”77 In other words, 
the innovation becomes a public good.78 A user innovator is free to reveal 
their innovation because they “receive[] sufficient ‘return on investment’ 
from developing and using the invention to compensate for expenditures on 
developing it.”79 The user innovator’s return on investment comes in many 
forms. For example, monetary compensation for use, reputational 
enhancement, or simple enjoyment of using the invention or of the 
inventive process.80 
Some technologies are more suited for user innovation than others.81 
The suitability of a technology with user innovation depends on several 
factors: “the heterogeneity of uses, the presence of lead users, the technical 
difficulty of invention in a particular field, and the costs of development.”82 
In a technology with high heterogeneity of uses, “many individual users or 
user firms want something different in a product type.”83 A technology with 
low heterogeneity of uses would already be satisfied through traditional 
commercial models because “[m]ass manufacturers tend to follow a 
strategy of developing products that are designed to meet the needs of a 
large market segment well enough to induce purchase from and capture 
significant profits from a large number of customers.”84 High heterogeneity 
of uses also leads to high willingness to pay to get what you want, which 
lends well to user innovation theory.85 
Lead users are users who are “ahead of the majority of users in their 
populations with respect to an important market trend.”86 Lead users 
“expect to gain relatively high benefits from a solution to the needs they 
have encountered there.”87 Because lead users are ahead of the market, they 
are more likely to make improvements to technology before the market. 
This also means that their needs are likely not represented on the market. 
Finally, because they expect to gain high benefits, they are more likely to 
incur the costs of developing the innovation on their own. 
For user innovator communities where social norms are informally 
enforced, rational choice theory explains how collective action problems 
 
 77 VON HIPPEL, supra note 51, at 9. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Strandburg, supra note 67, at 478. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Strandburg, supra note 70, at 294. 
 82 Id. 
 83 VON HIPPEL, supra note 51, at 33. 
 84 Id. at 5. 
 85 Id. at 5–6. 
 86 Id. at 4. 
 87 Id. 
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can be solved.88 The stability and viability of sharing within these 
communities depends on: 
 
(1) the fact that the norm is beneficial for community members in light of 
their preferences; 
(2) the community’s ability to detect defections from the norm; and 
(3) the community’s ability to impose penalties that are sufficient to deter 
defection yet not so costly to impose that they overwhelm the 
coordination benefit.89 
D. USER INNOVATION IN ORPHAN DISEASES 
Patients who engage in user innovation are motivated by the prospect 
of curing or improving their own disease. With this in mind, we can see 
how each patient innovation caters to their own individual motivations. 
Several studies have shown that orphan disease patients engage in 
innovation to create solutions to their own medical needs.90 For example, in 
one study, thirty-six percent of a sample of rare disease patients and their 
non-professional caregivers developed innovations to improve the 
management of their disease.91 In a more narrowly directed study, 
researchers found that fifty percent of the solutions for patients with cystic 
fibrosis were developed by patients.92 
These user innovations range from simple tools for everyday use to 
highly sophisticated solutions.93 For example, a daughter of a patient with 
dementia swapped colorful plates for white plates to minimize distraction 
while her father was eating.94 In another example, a mother of a patient 
with Angelman syndrome filled a room with floating balloons to encourage 
her child to jump and reach for the balloons, greatly increasing his physical 
abilities.95 Both examples are arguably simple tools for everyday use. 
Patients have also developed more sophisticated innovations. For example, 
a patient with Myasthenia gravis developed “a metal two-hook button aid 
that helps her button pants without the assistance of others.”96 In another 
example, a Marfan syndrome patient developed a textile mesh support for 
 
 88 Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Boundary between Academic 
and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2242 (2009). 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Canhão, supra note 52, at 32; Oliveira supra note 41, at 6. 
 91 Oliveira, supra note 41, at 4. 
 92 Canhão, supra note 52, at 31. 
 93 Oliveira, supra note 41, at 2. 
 94 Canhão, supra note 52, at 32. 
 95 Oliveira, supra note 41, at 4. 
 96 Id. at 5. 
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dilated heart aorta.97 From these selected examples, we can see that user 
innovation occurs within the context of patients with orphan diseases. 
E. LACK OF DIFFUSION BY PATIENT INNOVATORS 
Although patients with orphan diseases engage in successful user 
innovation, very few of these solutions are shared.98 In a study conducted 
by Pedro Oliveira, only thirty percent of the sample of orphan disease 
innovators reported sharing their solution in some way.99 Among those 
innovators who shared their solution, the vast majority shared it with other 
patients, but few showed it to medical professions, shared the information 
on a website or blog, shared it through media, showed it to commercial 
entities, spent time or money to help others use the solution, or made a 
manual that helps using the solution.100 
There are several reasons why patients may not share their 
innovations. For example, some may not have financial incentives or 
opportunities to enter the process of approval or commercialization.101 
However, financial incentives may not explain the entirety of the issue. 
Oliveira found that the “strongest predictor of information sharing was the 
observed difference in the respondents’ overall quality of life before and 
after using a solution.”102 If the solution does not improve quality of life, a 
patient may not feel that it is beneficial to share—if it didn’t help them, 
why would it help anyone else? 
IV. CURRENT EFFORTS’ SUCCESS AND CHALLENGES 
F. ORPHAN DRUG ACT 
The Orphan Drug Act is viewed as a huge success by many. “[I]n the 
decade before the law was passed only 10 new drugs for rare diseases were 
developed.”103 Now, there are roughly 770 FDA designated and approved 
orphan drug treatments.104 
As previously discussed, the FDA provides orphan drug designation 
for drugs targeted towards orphan diseases.105 Just from 2000 to 2009, over 
 
 97 Id. at 2. 
 98 Canhão, supra note 52, at 32. 
 99 Oliveira, supra note 41, at 5. 
 100 Id. at 7. 
 101 Canhão, supra note 52, at 33. 
 102 Oliveira, supra note 41, at 6. 
 103 Rensi, supra note 19. 
 104 Designations and Approvals, supra note 1. 
 105 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb (2017). 
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one thousand orphan drugs were designated as orphan drugs.106 With a rise 
in the number of designation requests, a backlog ensued in the FDA 
designation system.107 The FDA’s Orphan Drug Modernization Plan, 
unveiled in June 2017, seeks “to completely eliminate the agency’s existing 
orphan designation backlog and ensure continued timely response to all 
new requests for designation with firm deadlines.”108 In the first ninety 
days, around September 2017, the FDA planned to “complete reviews of all 
orphan drug designations . . . older than 120 days.”109 The FDA is also 
committed to responding to any subsequent designation requests within 
ninety days of their receipt.110 
Looking at the increase in orphan disease treatments, the Orphan Drug 
Act has largely been a success. Though the continued success of the 
Orphan Drug Act will depend on the elimination of the backlog. It is also 
important to note that the Orphan Drug Act may not do enough even to 
incentivize drug development, especially in cases where the number 
afflicted by a certain orphan disease is remarkably low. These diseases may 
have too small of a market to recoup the costs no matter how long the 
period of exclusivity is. 
The Orphan Drug Act has functioned without serious threats for over 
thirty years and funding has been appropriated through 2022.111 However, 
like any government policy, it is subject to change or removal. In 2017, in 
the wake of a new tax plan, Congress weighed repeal of the tax credit for 
orphan disease drugs.112 Repeal of the orphan drug tax credit would save 
the government approximately $54 billion over the next ten years.113 
Although some argued the cut would jeopardize orphan drug development, 
some argued that “major drugmakers have exploited [the program] by 
obtaining the orphan designation for billion-dollar blockbuster drugs . . . 
that were already on the market.”114 A new tax plan was enacted, and, for 
tax years beginning after 2017, the credit rate was cut in half; instead of the 
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previous 50% credit for orphan drug testing expenses, filers now receive a 
25% maximum credit.115 
G. PATENTABILITY CHALLENGES 
To be patentable, an invention must meet several requirements. If an 
invention does not meet each requirement, the patent application will be 
denied. Not all, but many user innovations will qualify for patent 
protection. 
1. § 103 – THE NOVELTY REQUIREMENT 
Patent claims must be non-obvious.116 The relevant statutory provision 
states: “A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that 
the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention.”117 
This statutory provision requires that an innovation be novel to be 
patentable. Many user innovations within the orphan disease space are not 
novel.118 Instead, the majority of these innovations are redevelopments—
”known to medicine, although not to the patient or caregivers who 
redeveloped them.”119 This indicates that many user innovations by patients 
with rare diseases would not be patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In fact, 
“solution novelty does not necessarily ensure utility for the user.”120 If a 
positive change in disease management or lifestyle motivates a patient to 
innovate, there may be little incentive to aim for novelty if it does not 
necessarily lead to utility. If novelty is not a goal of all user innovators 
within the orphan disease space, something beyond the patent system is 
required to incentivize innovation and sharing. 
2. § 112 – THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT 
Patent applications must contain a written description of the 
invention.121 The relevant statutory provision states: 
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The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, 
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall 
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor. . . .122 
A patent claim will be rendered “invalid if it is not supported by an 
enabling disclosure.”123 The purpose of this requirement is “to ensure that 
the invention is communicated to the interested public in a meaningful 
way.”124 So long as any person skilled in the art can make and use the 
invention without undue experimentation, the claimed invention will be 
enabled.125 Patient innovations will meet this requirement as long as the 
application is sufficiently detailed, regardless of the technology involved. 
3. § 101 – THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution granted Congress 
the power “[t]o promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts.“126 In 
turn, under 35 U.S.C. § 101, “an applicant must claim an invention that is 
statutory subject matter and must show that the claimed invention is 
‘useful’ for some purpose . . . .“127 If an applicant fails to identify specific 
and substantial utility or “fails to disclose enough information about the 
invention to make its usefulness immediately apparent to those familiar 
with the technological field of the invention,” a patent will not meet the 
useful invention requirement.128 To show specific and substantial utility, an 
applicant must show “that the claimed invention is useful for any particular 
practical purpose.”129 There need only be “one credible assertion of specific 
and substantial utility for each claimed invention to satisfy the utility 
requirement.”130 
Here, the question is whether an improvement in comfort or quality of 
life is enough to satisfy specific and substantial utility. Not all patient 
innovations will impact the course of their disease, as “patients may greatly 
value innovations that may have no impact on the course of their disease, 
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but that improve their comfort or other aspects of their quality of life while 
living with their disease.”131 
First, let’s examine the specific utility of patient innovations. In In re 
Fisher, the Federal Circuit stated that “specific utility” means that the 
subject matter claimed can “provide a well-defined and particular benefit to 
the public.”132 For example, a “general statement of diagnostic utility, such 
as diagnosing an unspecified disease, would ordinarily be insufficient 
absent a disclosure of what condition can be diagnosed.”133 Under this 
logic, as long as the patient innovator discloses the specific orphan disease 
applicable to the innovation, the specific utility requirement will be met. 
Next, let’s examine the substantial utility of patient innovations. To 
satisfy the “substantial utility” requirement, “an asserted use must show 
that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit 
to the public.”134 If the utility “require[s] or constitute[s] carrying out 
further research to identify or reasonably confirm a ‘real world’ context of 
use,” it is not a substantial utility.135 While a method of treating an 
unspecified disease or condition does not define “substantial utility” 
because it would require “carrying out further research to identify or 
reasonably confirm a ‘real world’ context of use,” a method of treating a 
specified disease or condition does define “substantial utility.”136 It 
generally follows that a patient innovation used to treat a specific orphan 
disease would result in a real world context of use. Thus, it would meet the 
“substantial utility” requirement. 
As long as a patient innovator identifies a specific orphan disease the 
innovation is directed towards, the claimed subject matter would meet the 
utility requirement for patentability under 21 U.S.C. § 101. 
4. § 101 – SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
Patent claims must be directed towards patentable subject matter.137 
The relevant statutory provision states: “Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”138 The terms 
“process,” “machine,” “manufacture,” and “composition of matter” limit 
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the subject matter that is eligible for patenting. Courts have also limited the 
subject matter that is eligible for patenting. Specifically, in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court reiterated that the “laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”139 
These are all examples of a judicial exception. Patient innovations that 
solely recite these exceptions will not be patentable. If a claim is directed to 
a judicial exception, the claim needs to amount to significantly more than 
the exception itself.140 This investigation is specific to the facts of each 
innovation, so a blanket statement of patentability of patient innovations 
cannot be made. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Current efforts to foster research on orphan diseases should be 
supplemented by solutions to encourage development of non-
pharmaceutical treatments. Additionally, sharing and commercialization of 
innovations made by the user innovation community should be bolstered. 
Patient innovation exists within the orphan disease community. However, 
patients need to be incentivized to share, or diffuse, their innovations to 
maximize impact of user innovation solutions. 
The current focus on pharmaceutical treatments disregards non-drug 
innovations that are cheaper and just as effective at treating the disease.141 
Currently, the Orphan Drug Act provides grants to orphan drug developers, 
but it doesn’t provide funding for patient innovators outside of the 
pharmaceutical space.142 Orphan Drug Act and patent eligibility for drugs 
should, however, be maintained as patient innovators are unlikely to 
develop drugs on their own due to their complicated, time intensive, and 
expensive nature. 
To shift some focus to non-pharmaceutical treatment innovation, 
contests available only to user innovators could be created. Due to the 
small market size, the availability of a reward for innovation of an orphan 
disease treatment is high-risk. Thus, contests must take away some risk 
from inventors with push, rather than pull, incentives.143 Assuming users 
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are innovating in an area with little or no patent eligibility, contests would 
provide patient innovators with financial incentives to innovate. If the 
innovation is chosen, the costs associated with developing that innovation 
will be recouped by the prize of the contest. The prize system could be run 
by government agencies, medical research centers, or private foundations. 
Although this is not a universal solution, as many innovations will not 
claim a prize, it will serve to supplement the programs already available to 
orphan disease research. 
To ensure widespread access to newly developed treatments, sharing 
by user innovators must be encouraged. Development and diffusion are 
incentivized when the cost of sharing is low.144 The cost of sharing within 
the traditional patent system is high due to application fees and upkeep 
fees. One way to reduce costs of sharing is an exchange platform for 
patient and caregiver interactions.145 Such a platform has been developed to 
inventory developed solutions.146 Additionally, infrastructure supporting 
exchange and communication between patients and doctors would decrease 
the cost of sharing. Increased communication between patients and their 
long-term doctors has previously achieved success in discovering treatment 
in other disease sectors.147 A platform for exchange of solutions between 
patients and doctors would certainly lower the cost of sharing solutions, but 
the communication between doctors and patients can also extend to the 
testing of those solutions. 
Primary care physicians and their patients diagnosed with an orphan 
disease can run their own trials on pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
treatments. Although primary care physicians and patients may be viewed 
as not sophisticated enough to run trials, they are the ideal candidates 
because “they [have] been managing the disease for years.”148 
Infrastructure platforms can be fostered with targeted grants for the 
creation of orphan disease treatment databases. The grants could go to 
intermediary organizations, such as NIH or NSF, to universities, or 
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established communities made up of patients, caregivers, and doctors. 
Instead of targeting grants toward a specific disease, the grants should be 
targeted towards broad infrastructure development for all orphan diseases. 
These infrastructure platforms will only succeed if “patients . . . who want 
to share information or organize a critique of medicine [can] seek out like-
minded individuals and find points of commonality with them.”149 To 
increase the success of these infrastructure platforms, the platform should 
be widely promulgated across orphan disease communities, including 
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